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JAM TOMORROW: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 
Barbara Stark* 
Abstract: The chasm between the rich and the poor has become unfa-
thomable. This Article asks whether existing international economic law 
can bridge this chasm and effectuate distributive justice. “Distributive jus-
tice” itself is an ambiguous goal. This Article inquires, as a threshold ques-
tion, what, exactly, is required for actual “distributive justice”. It takes as a 
starting point the relatively modest objective of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals—to halve the number living in extreme poverty by 2015. It 
argues that this objective is not going to be achieved under the aegis of 
international economic law for two reasons. First, distributive justice is not 
an objective of international economic law. Second, even if the political 
will existed, distributive justice would be unattainable because “interna-
tional economic law” is not a coherent legal subject with the capacity to 
make it happen. Neoliberalism cannot be relied upon to produce dis-
tributive justice, but neoliberalism is not the only game in town. 
“I’m sure I’ll take you with pleasure!” the Queen said. “Twopence a 
week, and jam every other day.” 
 Alice couldn’t help laughing, as she said “I don’t want you to hire 
me—and I don’t care for jam.” 
 “It’s very good jam,” said the Queen. 
 “Well, I don’t want any to-day, at any rate.” 
 “You couldn’t have it if you did want it,” the Queen said. 
 “The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday—but never jam to-
day.” 
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 “It must come sometimes to ‘jam to-day,’” Alice objected. 
 “No, it ca’n’t,” said the Queen. “It’s jam every other day: to-day 
isn’t any other day, you know.” 
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There 1 
Introduction 
 The chasm between the world’s rich and poor has become unfa-
thomable. As a recent UN study explains, global wealth is distributed so 
that “the richest 2 per cent of adult individuals in the world own half of 
all global wealth.”2 While the number of people living in poverty has in-
creased by almost 100 million, there are more billionaires than ever be-
fore—people who, as Barack Obama put it, “make more in 10 minutes 
than a worker makes in 10 months.”3 Even more disturbing, “the assets 
                                                                                                                      
1 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in The Anno-
tated Alice: The Definitive Edition 128, 196 (Martin Gardner ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1999) (1871). “Socialists often used to ridicule the capitalist system as offering the empty 
promise of ‘Jam tomorrow.’” The Phrase Finder, Jam Tomorrow, http://www.phrases.org. 
uk/meanings/211400.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). In fact as Labour politician Tony 
Benn said in 1969, “Some of the jam we thought was for tomorrow, we’ve already eaten.” 
The Phrase Finder, supra. 
2 James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth 7 (United Nations 
Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2008/03, 2008). This dis-
tributive inequity has been going on for some time. See, e.g., The U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Report of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights to the Econ. and Soc. Council, 
¶ 4–6, U.N. Doc. E/1999/96 P ( July 29, 1999), reprinted in Henry J. Steiner & Philip 
Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 239 (2d ed. 
2000) (noting growing economic polarization, in which the poorest increasingly lose 
ground). In the U.S. alone, “from 1997 to 2001, the top 1 percent captured far more of the 
real national gain in wage and salary income than did the bottom 50 percent.” Clive Crook, 
The Height of Inequality, Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 2006, at 36, 37. Until recently, the rate 
of polarization in the U.S. was increasing. See David Cay Johnston, Report Says That the Rich 
Are Getting Richer Faster, Much Faster, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2007, at C3 (noting that the in-
crease in income of the top one percent was greater than the total income of the bottom 
twenty percent). Whether those at the bottom are nevertheless better off is an open ques-
tion. The bottom line is unclear. “Most likely [globalization] has helped some to escape 
poverty and thrown others deeper into it.” Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of 
Globalization 89 (2d ed. 2004). 
3 See Eric Konigsberg, A New Class War: The Haves vs. the Have Mores, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
19, 2006, at WK1 (explaining that the “superrich” —the $20 million a year households—
“are getting richer almost twice as fast as the rich” —the top one percent of households 
with an average income of $940,000); Jeff Zeleny, Obama Proposes Tax Cut for Middle Class 
and Retirees, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2007, at A22; see also Jenny Anderson & Julie Craswell, 
Make Less Than $240 Million? You’re Off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2007, at Al 
(noting that “the top 25 hedge fund managers last year earned $14 billion—enough to pay 
New York City’s 80,000 public school teachers for nearly three years”); Stephen Taub, The 
Top 25 Moneymakers: The New Tycoons, Alpha, Apr. 24, 2007, at 39, 41–42 (noting that the 
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of the world’s richest three individuals exceeded the combined Gross 
National Products of all of the least developed countries, with a popula-
tion totaling 600 million people.”4 
 This Article asks whether distributive justice can be realized 
through existing international economic law. “Distributive justice” is an 
ambiguous goal. If we simply mean “more fair than what we have now,” 
“distributive justice” is within easy reach because we could hardly do 
worse. Merely rolling back some of the generous de-regulation and out-
right gifts that have brought us here would be a start, and has already 
begun.5 The global economic crisis has certainly toppled some of the 
mighty, but the worst-off may be even worse off, and many are likely to 
join them.6 
 As a threshold question, it should accordingly be established what, 
exactly, is required for actual “distributive justice.” I take as a starting 
point the relatively modest objective of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)—to halve the number living in extreme poverty by 
                                                                                                                      
more than $14 billion earned by the top twenty-five hedge fund managers was equivalent 
to the GDP of Jordan or Uruguay). An additional 100 million people live in poverty, even 
as total world income has increased by 2.5%. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
Discontents 5 (2003); see also Oxfam Faults Response to Famine in Africa, N.Y. Times, July 24, 
2006, at A10 (noting that “the number of food emergencies has nearly tripled in 20 
years”). 
4 Singer, supra note 2, at 81 (citing UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, at 3) (em-
phasis added). 
5 See David Leonhardt, A Bold Plan Sweeps Away Reagan Ideas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2009, 
at A1 (describing President Obama’s ten-year budget which, “[m]ore than anything else 
. . . seek[s] to reverse the rapid increase in economic inequality over the last 30 years” by 
increasing taxes on the wealthiest). The budget also allocates $51.7 billion for the State 
Department and foreign aid, which puts the United States “on a path to double foreign 
assistance,” according to the White House. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Help Abroad, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 27, 2009, at A17. 
6 See Edmund L. Andrews, Report Projects a Worldwide Economic Slide, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 
2009, at B1 (citing economists for the World Bank predicting that “the global economy 
and the volume of global trade would both shrink this year for the first time since World 
War II . . . .” with grim consequences for the world’s poor); Editorial, The Crisis at Home and 
Abroad, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2009, at A30 (urging “leaders of industrial nations . . . to pro-
vide large-scale financial assistance to avert an economic catastrophe in the developing 
world”); see, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Household Wealth Falls by Trillions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2009, at 
B1 (noting that while American households lost $5.1 trillion in the last quarter of 2008, 
“the loss was concentrated among the most affluent”); Andrew E. Kramer, The Last Days of 
the Oligarchs?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2009, at B1 (noting that “few businessmen anywhere have 
fallen as hard or as fast in recent months” as Russia’s richest men, the top twenty-five of 
whom lost $230 billion between May and October); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Global Fund Is 
Billions Short as Downturn Cuts Pledges from Donor Nations, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2009, at D6 
(noting that pledges from donor states “are running about $5 billion short of what is 
needed through 2010”). 
6 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:3 
2015.7 As economist and Director of the MDG Jeffrey Sachs points out, 
the wealth is there.8 It is just a matter of moving it around.9 
 My thesis here is that this will not happen under the aegis of inter-
national economic law for two reasons. First, distributive justice is not 
an objective of international economic law. Rather, its objective is to 
maintain the neoliberal economic order, grounded in free markets and 
individual autonomy.10 Second, even if the political will were there, it 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Millennium Development Goals Report 
2009, at 4 (2009). Although the goal of “development” has not always been so specific, the 
general objective of reducing poverty and inequality has characterized a part of the World 
Bank called the International Development Association (“IDA”) since its inception in 
1960. See infra note 12. The extremely poor consist of 1.1 billion humans subsisting on less 
that one dollar a day. See The World Bank, Dramatic Decline in Global Poverty, but Pro-
gress Uneven, Apr. 23, 2004, http://go.worldbank.org/84RMEOWD20. 
8 See Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty 26–50 (2005) (describing the growth of the 
global economy). The 2008 global gross domestic product was $60,587,016. World Bank, 
World Development Indicators Database 4 (2009). As recently as February, 2009, Sachs 
insisted that the wealth was still there, although the wealthy states refused to honor their ear-
lier pledges: “The poor are refused $5 billion, while wealthy countries have found $3 trillion 
for bank bailouts and Wall Street bankers awarded themselves $18 billion in . . . bonuses 
while accepting those bailouts. This is absolutely in violation of the life and death pledges 
that the rich world made to the poor.” McNeil, supra note 6. But see, e.g., Sanjay Reddy & An-
toine Heuty, The End of Poverty? 1, http://www.columbia.edu/~sr793/endofpoverty.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2009) (noting that Sachs accepts a “questionable orthodox prescription for 
economic development”). 
9 See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty And Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsi-
bilities and Reforms 7 (2002) (noting that a meaningful reduction of global poverty could 
be accomplished through a redistribution of just “1.2% of the aggregate annual gross na-
tional incomes of the high income economies.”); see also Note, Never Again Should a People 
Starve in a World of Plenty, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1886, 1892 (2008) (urging law students—and 
presumably everyone else—to “[d]o the [r]ight [t]hing at [e]very moment,” that is, if, “with 
a donation of $200, a child’s life can be saved,” you have a moral obligation to do so). But see 
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and 
What Can Be Done About It, at xi (2007). Collier notes: 
 Unfortunately, it is not just about giving these countries [where “the bot-
tom billion” live] our money. If it were, it would be relatively easy . . . . [but] 
aid does not work so well in these environments, at least as it has been pro-
vided in the past. Change in the societies at the very bottom must come pre-
dominantly from within; we cannot impose it on them. 
Id. 
10 I use “neoliberal” here to distinguish a global economy in which “the value of stock 
markets has lost all grounding in materiality,” replaced by “casino capitalism,” as opposed 
to earlier forms of liberalism, grounded in more concrete notions of property. See Jean 
Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming, in 
Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism 1, 7–8 ( Jean Comaroff & 
John L. Comaroff eds., 2001). Additionally, a crucial aspect of these fundamental values, as 
Carol Gould notes, is a human rights framework that inadequately recognizes basic eco-
nomic and social rights. See Carol Gould, Approaching Global Justice Through Human Rights: 
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would not happen because “international economic law” is not a co-
herent legal subject with the capacity to make it happen.11 Rather, “in-
ternational economic law” is a loose collection of international organi-
zations (IOs) used by states to further a range of shifting objectives.12 
Most recently, states have sought to realize these objectives through the 
cluster of premises referred to as the “Washington Consensus.”13 These 
include, according to Kerry Rittich: “[T]hat the implementation of ef-
ficiency enhancing rules is an uncontentious goal, that everyone stands 
to gain from free trade, that property and contract rights are the para-
mount legal entitlements, and that rule-based regimes ‘level the playing 
field’ and ensure fairness among otherwise unequal parties.”14 
 The first argument, that these premises are fundamentally at odds 
with distributive justice, draws on Marxist theory.15 The second argu-
                                                                                                                      
Elements of Theory and Practice, in Distributive Justice and International Economic 
Law (Chios Carmody et al. eds., forthcoming 2009). 
11 This Article draws on critical and postmodern approaches which some commenta-
tors perhaps prudently eschew in the context of international economic law. See, e.g., John 
Linarelli, What Do We Owe Each Other in the Global Economic Order?: Constructivist and Contrac-
tual Accounts, 15 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 181, 184 (2006) (“No critical or postmodern 
approaches are undertaken.”). 
12 These IOs include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank). Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S 134 (setting out mission of the World 
Bank to alleviate poverty). 
13 World Economic Forum, Death of the Washington Consensus?, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledge/Events/2009/KN_SESS_SUMM_26943?url=/en/ 
knowledge/Events/2009/KN_SESS_SUMM_26943 (summarizing a panel discussion at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos). This panel discussion concluded that “[t]alk of the death 
of the Washington Consensus is exaggerated, although parts of it will need revision in light of 
the global economic crisis. The core principles of consensus—good economic governance, 
trade liberalization and fiscal discipline—remain valid . . . . [b]ut, given the controversy sur-
rounding it, the Consensus may need a new name.” Id. 
14 Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions of Law, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 727, 739–
40 (2003); see also David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Com-
mon Sense, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 95, 129 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (“[Under the Washington Consensus,] [a]n 
economy was now imagined as a ‘market’ in which individual economic actors transact 
with one another . . . . Government is there less to manage the economy than to support 
the market. Moreover, there is no reason to think of economies in national terms.”); David 
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory 
and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in The New Law and Economic Development: 
A Critical Appraisal, supra, at 1, 17 (discussing critical analyses of development theory). 
Yet, Aaron James suggests a fundamental shift in this paradigm toward “structural fair-
ness.” See Aaron James, Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles, in Distributive Justice 
and International Economic Law, supra note 10. 
15 Marxist theory, of course, is a vast terrain. For a comprehensive introduction to the 
subject, see Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, the 
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ment, that “international economic law” could not produce distributive 
justice if all of the participants at the World Economic Forum burst into 
The Internationale, draws on postmodern theory.16 But I propose neither 
a Marxist nor a postmodern “solution” to the problem.17 Rather, I sim-
ply hope to show that neoliberalism cannot be relied upon to produce 
distributive justice and further that it is not the only game in town.18 
Margaret Thatcher’s edict, “There is no alternative,” is nonsense worthy 
of Alice’s Queen.19 
                                                                                                                      
Golden Age, the Breakdown (P.S. Falla trans., W.W. Norton & Company 2005) (1978). My 
discussion focuses particularly on Marxist theory as recently reassessed by a new generation 
of theorists, including international legal scholars such as Susan Marks and Anthony Carty. 
See generally International Law on the Left: Re-Examining Marxist Legacies (Susan 
Marks ed., 2008). 
16 The Internationale is the international song of both Marxist and non-Marxist socialist 
parties, written in French by Eugene Pottier after the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871, 
and set to the music by P. Degeyter. The Modern Sourcebook, The Internationale, Aug. 
1997, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/internat.html. The World Economic Forum, 
even in happier years when Bono attended, has been unlikely to burst into song. Indeed, 
the group of world leaders and financiers that the German economist Klaus Schwab in-
vited to Davos was markedly somber this year. See Nelson D. Schwartz, At Davos, Economic 
Crisis Culls the Guest List, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2009, at B1. 
17 See infra Parts II–Conclusion (explaining, respectively, why Marxism, like other 
Enlightenment metanarratives, is suspect, and why postmodernism does not provide “solu-
tions”). My arguments are not cumulative, as my aim is not to construct a new metanarra-
tive. 
18 See also Barbara Stark, Theories of Poverty/The Poverty of Theory, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 381, 
391–407 (explaining why traditional liberal theory cannot be relied upon for this pur-
pose). 
19 See, e.g., Claire Berlinski, ”There Is No Alternative”: Why Margaret Thatcher 
Matters 148 (2008) (noting that from 1972 to 1992 the average income of the richest tenth 
rose sixty-one percent, while the income of the poorest tenth decreased by eighteen per-
cent). As Gardner notes, “In a sense, nonsense itself is a sanity-insanity inversion. The ordi-
nary world is turned upside down and backward; it becomes a world in which things go every 
way except the way they are supposed to.” Carroll, supra note 1, at 142 n.5 (commentary of 
Martin Gardner, ed.). This is not to downplay, or underestimate, the hegemony of neoliberal-
ism, which many scholars concede. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: 
A Review Essay, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1528, 1529 (2008) (arguing that “by the end of the Cold 
War, the old struggle between right and left over the governance of the economy and the 
redistribution of wealth within the advanced liberal democracies had yielded to a new pro-
market consensus.”) There is, however, a loyal opposition. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Interliberal 
Law: Comment, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 249, 250 (2000) (expressing “extreme skepti-
cism” regarding “any attempt to draw distinctions between ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ states”). 
There are also outliers, ranging from the “new new left,” to globalization’s discontents, to the 
barbarians at the gate. See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and De-
mocracy in the Age of Empire, at xi–xii, 34 (2004); Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 1–7; Thomas 
N. Hale & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Hardt & Negri’s Multitude: The Worst of Both Worlds, open-
Democracy, May 25, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/ 
marx_2549.jsp. 
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I. A Marxist Critique 
“Face it: Marx was partly right about capitalism.” 
—Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury20 
A. Why Marx Now? 
 My first argument draws on Karl Marx—not as an economist, but 
as a political theorist.21 I draw on Marx because, as Tony Judt points 
out, “From first to last, Marxism’s strongest suit was . . . ‘the moral seri-
ousness of [his] conviction that the destiny of our world as a whole is 
tied up with the condition of its poorest and most disadvantaged mem-
bers.’”22 In addition, as Judt further notes, “Marxism . . . is now once 
again, largely for want of competition, the common currency of inter-
national protest movements.”23 
                                                                                                                      
20 Rowan Williams, Face It: Marx Was Partly Right About Capitalism, Spectator, Sept. 27, 
2008, http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/2172131/face-it-marx-was-partly-right-about-
capitalism.thtml. 
21 Marx has been many things to many people. Carol Gould, for example, provides an 
original and provocative perspective on Marx. See Carol C. Gould, Marx’s Social On-
tology, at xi (1978) (proposing a new approach to Marx as a “great systemic philosopher 
in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel”). Marx remains a useful tool for critique, 
although the limits of Marxist critique are well-known. As Tony Judt observes, “the predic-
tive powers of Marxian economics have long been discounted even by the left.” Tony Judt, 
Goodbye to All that?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 21, 2006, at 88 (reviewing Jacques Attali, Karl 
Marx ou L’esprit du Monde (2005); Kolakowski, supra note 15; and Leszek Kola-
kowski, My Correct Views on Everything (Zbigniew Janowski ed., 2005)). 
22 Judt, supra note 21, at 92. For a rigorous and compelling analysis of the challenge of 
attaining both distributive justice and democratic governance, see Chantel Thomas, Democ-
ratic Governance, Distributive Justice and Development, in Distributive Justice and Interna-
tional Economic Law, supra note 10. 
23 Judt, supra note 21, at 92. Naomi Klein recently observed, “This is a progressive 
moment: it’s ours to lose.” Larissa MacFarquhar, Outside Agitator: Naomi Klein and the New 
New Left, New Yorker, Dec. 8, 2008, at 61, 62; see also Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism 466 (2007) (“[L]ocal people’s renewal movements 
begin from the premise that there is no escape from the substantial messes we have cre-
ated and . . . . do not seek to start from scratch but rather from scrap, from the rubble that 
is all around.”). As Stiglitz notes, Klein is no economist. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Bleakonomics, 
N.Y. Times Book. Rev., Sept. 30, 2007, at 12. But she may be right. As Judt observes: 
What Marx’s nineteenth century contemporaries called the “Social Ques-
tion” —how to address and overcome huge disparities of wealth and poverty, 
and shameful inequalities of health, education and opportunity—may have 
been answered in the West (though the gulf between poor and rich, which 
once seemed steadily to be closing, has for some years been opening again, in 
Britain and above all in the U.S.). But the Social Question is back on the in-
ternational agenda with a vengeance. What appears to its prosperous benefi-
ciaries as worldwide economic growth . . . is increasingly perceived and re-
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 Marx has been anathema in the United States for decades.24 Be-
fore Senator Joseph McCarthy fell from grace, he eviscerated the 
American left; disillusionment with the Soviet brand of Marxism fin-
ished the job.25 As the anti-globalism activist Naomi Klein explains, 
 My grandparents were pretty hardcore Marxists, and in the 
thirties and forties they believed fervently in the dream of 
egalitarianism that the Soviet Union represented . . . . They 
had their illusions shattered by the reality of gulags, of ex-
treme repression, hypocrisy, Stalin’s pact with Hitler . . . . The 
left has been held accountable for the crimes committed in 
the name of its extreme ideologies, and I believe that’s been a 
very healthy process.26 
The demonization of Marxism has been costly, though. It has chilled 
debate, prevented labor, civil rights activists, and feminists from taking 
bold positions, and generally inhibited the development of any robust, 
                                                                                                                      
sented by millions of others as the redistribution of global wealth for the 
benefit of a handful of corporations and holders of capital. 
Judt, supra note 21, at 92. 
24 Marxism is “out-dated, oversimplified and wrong.” Hale & Slaughter, supra note 19; 
see also Mark Leibovich, ‘Socialism!’ Boo, Hiss, Repeat, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2009, at WK1 (not-
ing that “the socialist bogey-mantra has made a full-scale return after a long stretch of rela-
tive dormancy” as conservatives attack bank bailouts and stimulus bills). 
25 See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholar-
ship, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 993, 1071, 1075 (1989). For more information on McCarthyism and 
its effect on culture, see generally Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the 
Origins of McCarthyism (1972); Thomas C. Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe 
McCarthy: A Biography (1982); and Dalton Trumbo, The Time of the Toad, in The Time of 
the Toad: A Study of Inquisition in America 3, 9–63 (1972) (discussing “blacklisted” 
Hollywood writers). 
26 MacFarquhar, supra note 23, at 71; see also David Lodge, Goodbye to All that, N.Y. Rev. 
Books, May 27, 2004, at 6 (reviewing Terry Eagleton, After Theory (2003)) (noting 
that Eagleton fails to “explicit[ly] acknowledge[ ]” that Marxism, as implemented in Russia 
and Eastern Europe, was “inimical to people’s free development.”). If such an acknowl-
edgement is required here, this footnote is it. 
Klein argues that neoliberals should similarly be held accountable: 
When you start issuing policy prescriptions, when you start advising heads of 
state, you no longer have the luxury of only being judged on how you think 
your ideas will affect the world. You begin having to contend with how they 
actually affect the world, even when that reality contradicts all of your utopian 
theories. 
MacFarquhar, supra note 23, at 71. 
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homegrown American socialism.27 As David Richards observed almost 
twenty-five years ago: 
[T]he painfully evident bankruptcy of coherent political phi-
losophy of the American left may have both political and legal 
consequences. To address this problem, the American left 
must develop a philosophically articulate conviction of the jus-
tice of its political ideals. To achieve this development, the left 
must understand and publicly acknowledge both its continui-
ties and discontinuities with the socialist and Marxist perspec-
tives on political philosophy. Unfortunately, these perspectives 
have traditionally been excluded from serious political discus-
sion in this country. This lacuna, exacerbated by recurrent 
red-baiting, deprives us of serious discussion of the full range 
of democratic political alternatives on the left.28 
 Europeans have not been hobbled in the same way. In 2004, for 
instance, in response to the American invasion of Iraq, a group of 
prominent European legal scholars convened the Symposium, Marxism 
and International Law, to explore the causes of the “material economic 
woes of international society.”29 Like them, I draw on Marx to explore 
what Martti Koskenniemi calls “a sense of the loss of international law’s 
emancipatory promise, [and] a creeping scepticism about whether 
there ever was any such project to begin with.”30 
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., Ansley, supra note 25, at 1075 (“All progressive movements for social change in 
the United States have been buffeted and weakened by these [anti-communist] winds.”); Jon 
D. Michaels, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Wel-
fare Rights, 111 Yale L.J. 1457, 1458 (2002) (“[S]ubstantive welfare rights are completely 
anathema to the Lockean tradition.”). American resistance to welfare rights has affected the 
international standing of such rights. See generally Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in 
Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 137, 149 (Louis Henkin & John 
Hargrove eds., 1994) (describing international neglect of economic, social, and cultural 
rights). 
28 David A.J. Richards, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1188, 1188 (1985) (reviewing Al-
len E. Buchanan, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (1982); 
Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (1985); and Kai Nielsen, Equality and Lib-
erty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism (1985)) (footnotes omitted). 
29 Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American (Twenty- 
First) Century?, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 247, 247 (2004); Matthew Craven et al., We Are Teachers 
of International Law, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 363, 363 (2004) (stating that a group of Euro-
pean legal scholars came together in reaction to impending war). Some of the essays in the 
Symposium were revised and reprinted in International Law on the Left: Re-
examining Marxist Legacies, supra note 15. 
30 Martti Koskenniemi, What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?, 17 Lei-
den J. Int’l L. 229, 229 (2004). Like Koskenniemi, I am “using Marx in an instrumental 
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B. Ideology 
 The important concept here is Marx’s idea of ideology, that is, the 
notion that power relations shape the way we think.31 As Marx suc-
cinctly put it, “The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of 
its ruling class.”32 Today, the “ruling class” is made up of those who 
drive the neoliberal economic order, including industrialized states and 
transnational corporations. As Peter Singer notes, 
One hundred and fifty years ago, Karl Marx gave a one-
sentence summary of his theory of history: “The hand mill 
gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society 
with the industrial capitalist.” Today he could have added: “The 
jet plane, the telephone, and the Internet give you a global so-
ciety with the transnational corporation and the World Eco-
nomic Forum.”33 
Singer’s observation rings true because, from a Marxist perspective, 
international law has supported the ruling class for a long time. As 
Susan Marks explains, in the 1920s the Russian jurist E.B. Pashukanis 
described how capitalist states banded together, dividing the world into 
states which were “civilized” and those which were not.34 The former, 
consisting of those states which had adopted capitalism, were entitled 
to the protection of international law. The latter, “the remainder of the 
world,” were “considered as a simple object of [the capitalist states’] 
completed transactions.”35 Susan Marks also discusses the work of An-
tony Anghie, who has shown how colonialism shaped international 
                                                                                                                      
and heretical fashion, in order to assist in a project that can scarcely be called Marxian in 
any traditional sense.” Id. at 230. 
31 Critical legal scholars, critical race scholars, and feminists, among others, have got-
ten considerable mileage from this idea. “Marxism, in short, was the ‘deep structure’ of 
much progressive politics. Marxist language, or a language parasitic upon Marxist catego-
ries, gave form and an implicit coherence to many kinds of modern political protest: from 
social democracy to radical feminism.” Judt, supra note 21, at 8; see also Slavoj Žižek, The 
Spectre of Ideology, in Mapping Ideology 1, 1–3 (Slavoj Žižek ed., 1994). 
32 Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels 
Reader 469, 489 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). As Susan Marks points out, “[T]he 
problem with ideology is not that it involves error, but that it sustains privilege.” Susan 
Marks, Introduction to International Law on the Left: Re-Examining Marxist Lega-
cies, supra note 15, at 1, 8. 
33 Singer, supra note 2, at 10. 
34 See Susan Marks, Empire’s Law, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 449, 456–57 (2003). 
35 Id. 
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law.36 The influence of colonialism can be gleaned from the example of 
Francisco de Victoria, who “legitimate[d] Spanish conquest and dispos-
session in the Americas by defining the peoples of the region as non-
sovereign.”37 Marks concludes by urging scholars of globalization not to 
neglect the manner in which its “processes intersect with and repro-
duce pre-existing forms of exploitation and exclusion.”38 Failure to 
note these underlying motifs would perpetuate a “long and inglorious 
tradition in international legal scholarship . . . of covering up for inter-
national law,” as revealed through the works of those like Pashukanis 
and Anghie.39 
 Just as capitalist states shaped international law in the 1920s, and 
colonialism shaped early international conceptions of sovereignty, to-
day neoliberal ideology shapes the institutions, such as the IMF, the 
World Bank, the WTO, and even the non-binding MDG, that purport 
to restrain it.40 These institutions, whose policies collectively account 
                                                                                                                      
36 See id. at 547; see also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making 
of International Law 223–25 (2005) (arguing that international law is deeply grounded 
in colonialism). 
37 See Marks, supra note 34, at 458. Marks demonstrates her point with a historical ex-
ample: empire. She sets out a detailed account of Hardt and Negri’s description of empire, 
which she agrees is qualitatively different from earlier forms of imperialism. See id. at 461–
62. Marks’s admonition is buttressed by Hardt and Negri’s, finding that a primary differ-
ence between empire and its imperial predecessors was a change in the “structures of 
domination,” in part through a process of “deterritorialization.” Id. at 463–64. 
38 Id. at 464. 
39 Id.; see Howse, supra note 19, at 1529. Howse discusses Jürgen Habermas’s definition 
of globalization, stating: 
[T]he cumulative processes of a worldwide expansion of trade and produc-
tion, commodity and financial markets, fashions, the media and computer 
programs, news and communications networks, transportation systems and 
flows of migration, the risks generated by large-scale technology, environ-
mental damage and epidemics, as well as organized crime and terrorism. 
Howse, supra note 19, at 1529 (quoting Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West 175 (Ci-
aran Cronin ed. & trans., 2006)). 
40 See Dep’t of Soc. & Econ. Affairs, supra note 7; José E. Alvarez, Factors Driving and 
Constraining the Incorporation of International Law in WTO Adjudication, in The WTO: Gov-
ernance, Dispute Settlement, and Developing Countries 611, 611 (Merit E. Janow et 
al. eds., 2008); Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. Int’l Econ. Law 527, 527 
(2008) (stating that there is a general political liberal theory behind the WTO but no es-
tablished legal theory); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making 
and Unmaking of the Third World 72 (1995) (explaining how the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions supported the private sector by expanding domestic and foreign markets); Fer-
nando Teson, Free Trade, in Distributive Justice and International Economic Law, 
supra note 10 (providing a thought-provoking defense of free trade). For a comprehensive 
and groundbreaking critique, see Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and Justice: To-
ward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade (2003). 
14 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:3 
for what we understand to be international economic law, arose post-
World War II. In fact, the World Bank was established by those who met 
at Bretton Woods in 1944 to finance reconstruction in Europe after 
World War II.41 In 1960, the International Development Association 
(IDA) was established within the World Bank to focus on the needs of 
the poorest states.42 Although that objective was expressly defined, it is 
clear that distributive justice has never been the focus of international 
economic law. Rather, that law, operating through the institutions of 
the IMF and the WTO, has focused more on trade.43 The premise be-
hind this fixation on trade is that “boosting economic growth” through 
trade is key to reducing “poverty and inequality.”44 
 This premise, however, has been criticized as the self-serving ide-
ology of the developed states. Indeed, according to Arturo Escobar, lib-
eral ideology has shaped development discourse for its own purpose 
beginning with the “discovery” of poverty after World War II.45 Accord-
                                                                                                                      
41 Elizabeth A. Mandeville, United Nations Development Programme, in 5 Oxford Ency-
clopedia of Human Rights 150, 150–51 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009) (“[Post World-War 
II, there were] two new grand efforts in international cooperation and relations—the hu-
man rights movement, which sought to assure that these political and civil rights were 
globally afforded and protected, and the development movement, which sought to create 
standards of living and institutions of support in the development world to foster econo-
mies (and thus societies) in which these freedoms could be guaranteed.”). See generally 
Barry Carter et al., International Law 483–84 (4th ed. 2003); Stiglitz, supra note 3, 
at 11–12 (explaining the economic theory behind the Bretton Woods institutions). 
42 Carter et al., supra note 41, at 485. 
43 This focus is consistent with its liberal roots. Those who shaped post-Cold War ap-
proaches to poverty similarly drew on a wide range of well-known liberal philosophers. 
John Rawls, a leading American moral and political philosopher, is conspicuously absent in 
part because he did not address the concerns of internationalists. See, e.g., Singer, supra 
note 2, at 8–9 (recalling his astonishment that John Rawls could completely ignore “ex-
tremes of wealth and poverty that exist between different societies [and in] the most influ-
ential work on justice written in twentieth-century America, this question never even 
arises”); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Welcome to Cosmopolis, World of Boundless Opportunity, 39 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 477, 488–98 (2006) (providing an incisive critique of Rawls). When 
Rawls eventually did address global justice issues, he contemplated closed societies that 
generally did not have obligations to aid each other. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
115–19 (1999) (defending closed societies on “moral hazard” grounds; that is, if people 
may freely migrate to more prosperous places, they will have no incentive to invest their 
time and effort in the poorer places where they are born). 
44 See Escobar, supra note 40, at 21–24. 
45 See id. at 21 (describing the “discovery” of mass poverty in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
American after World War II); see also Marks, supra note 32, at 13. (“[T]he production of 
‘under-development’ is not simply spontaneous. . . . [I]t entails the use of coercive force.”). 
As Majid Rahnema has noted, 
[N]obody . . . seems to have a clear, and commonly shared, view of poverty. 
For one reason, almost all the definitions given to the word are woven around 
the concept of ‘lack’ or ‘deficiency.’ This notion reflects only the basic relativ-
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ing to Escobar, although development promises a “kingdom of abun-
dance[,] . . . the discourse and strategy of development [has] produced 
its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold 
exploitation and oppression, [including] [t]he debt crisis, the Sahelian 
famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence.”46 Although 
there have been isolated successes, the failures of development have 
been well-documented as Escobar describes.47 These shortcomings in-
clude the failure to improve the material lives of the world’s poor, to 
get twelve cent medicines to children to prevent malaria, and to pro-
vide four dollar bed nets to poor families despite spending $2.3 trillion 
on foreign aid.48 Even worse, some critics believe development has con-
tinued the destructive processes of colonialism by eviscerating local cul-
tures and by draining least developed countries (LDCs) of their most 
valuable resources, from oil and gold to the best educated young peo-
ple and even healthy babies.49 Development has been a failure, these 
                                                                                                                      
ity of the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is qualified to 
define all that? 
Escobar, supra note 40, at 21 (quoting Majid Rahnema, Global Poverty: A Pauperizing 
Myth (1991)). 
46 Escobar, supra note 40, at 4. This apparent paradox of development is nothing new. 
See id. But see William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why The West’s Efforts 
to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good 271 (2006) (citing Har-
vard historian Niall Ferguson for the proposition that there is “such a thing as liberal im-
perialism and that on balance it was a good thing . . . . In many cases of economic ‘back-
wardness’ a liberal empire can do better than a nation state.”) (quoting Niall Ferguson, 
Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire 198 (2004)); Amartya Sen, The Man Without a 
Plan, Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 174 (acknowledging Ferguson’s proposition). 
See generally 50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994) (collecting a number of works which 
criticize the World Bank’s “progress”). 
47 See Escobar, supra note 40, at 21; Sen, supra note 46, at 172 (describing “success of 
many international aid efforts”); see also Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor: Mi-
crolending and the Battle Against World Poverty 62–63, 110–12 (2003) (describing 
origins and successes of the Grameen Bank and its microfinancing projects). 
48 Virginia Postrel, The Poverty Puzzle, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2006, at A12 (“The West is 
not stingy. It is ineffective.”); see Easterly, supra note 46, at 13–14 (2006). “[W]hen agen-
cies hand out free nets, they are often diverted to the black market . . .[and] wind up be-
ing used as fishing nets or wedding veils.” Easterly, supra note 46, at 13. In Zambia, for 
example, seventy percent of the recipients of free nets did not use them. Id. Yet, in con-
trast, in Malawi, a program through which nets were sold for a nominal amount increased 
the number of young children who slept “under nets from 8 percent in 2000 to 55 percent 
in 2004.” Id. Almost all of those who paid for the nets used them. Id. 
49 See, e.g., Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Case Studies and Common Trends 
in Globalization: Introduction, in Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Regulations 
and Innovation 9, 11 ( Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000) (defining 
globalization as “the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in . . . ex-
tending its reach over the globe and, in by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a 
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critics contend, but only for the LDCs. It has been quite profitable for 
the West.50 
C. Money Flows Uphill 
 It has been argued that development has not only benefited the 
industrial Western states more than it has benefited the LDCs, but that 
it has done so at the expense of the LDCs. First, as Oxfam and others 
have pointed out, a significant portion of aid dollars never leaves the 
developed states.51 Rather, it is spent on paying the salaries of consult-
ants, bureaucrats and technical advisors.52 Even aid dollars that actually 
arrive in the LDCs may not reach their intended beneficiaries.53 Paul 
Collier describes a 2004 survey tracking funds intended for rural health 
clinics in Chad: 
 The survey had the extremely modest purpose of finding 
out how much of the money actually reached the clinics—not 
whether the clinics spent it well, or whether staff of the clinics 
knew what they were doing, just where the money went. 
Amazingly, less than 1 percent of it reached the clinics—99 
percent failed to reach its destination.54 
                                                                                                                      
rival social condition or entity as local”); Edward W. Said, Yeats and Decolonization, in Na-
tionalism, Colonialism, and Literature 69, 69–71 (Terry Eagleton et al. eds., 1990) 
(“By the beginning of World War I, Europe and America held 85 percent of the earth’s 
surface in some sort of colonial subjugation. This . . . did not happen in a fit of absent-
minded whimsy or as a result of a distracted shopping spree.”); Robert S. Gordon, The New 
Chinese Export: Orphaned Children—An Overview of Adoption of Children from China, 10 Trans-
nat’l Law. 121, 129 (1997) (describing the perception of babies as exports); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 147–151 (describing the New International Economic Order). 
Nevertheless, others view babies as the most vulnerable refugees. See Elizabeth Bar-
tholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting 143 (1993); Howard 
Altstein & Rita J. Simon, Introduction to Intercountry Adoption: A Multinational Per-
spective 1, 13 (Howard Altstein & Rita J. Simon eds., 1991). 
50 See, e.g., Oxfam Am., Smart Development: Why U.S. Foreign Aid Demands Ma-
jor Reform 19, 22, 24 (2008). 
51 See id. at 24. 
52 See id. at 19, 22, 24 (pointing out that the United States frequently includes clawback 
provisions in aid packages); see also Collier, supra note 9, at 4 (“The World Bank has large 
offices in every major middle-income country but not a single person residing in the Cen-
tral African Republic.”). 
53 See Collier, supra note 9, at 66. 
54 Id.; see also Jan M. Rosen, Ensuring That Gifts Go Where They’re Needed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
11, 2008, at F26. As Easterly argues, “[i]t’s time for the rich-country public to insist that aid 
money actually reaches the poor.” Easterly, supra note 46, at 207. 
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Even where corruption takes less of a bite, Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
estimate that about eleven percent of aid is diverted to the military, and 
in Africa, such aid supports approximately forty percent of military 
spending.55 Finally, even when aid actually reaches its intended benefi-
ciaries, it is subject to diminishing returns.56 In other words, “the first 
million dollars is more productive than the second, and so on.”57 Gen-
erally, when aid exceeds about sixteen percent of GDP, it is no longer 
effective.58 In 2007, aid to Africa was approaching that figure.59 This 
statistic suggests that soon “we [will] have broadly reached the limits to 
aid absorption, at least under existing modalities.”60 
 Second, loans to developing states have often been more benefi-
cial to their lenders than to the recipient states.61 While credit has been 
extended, even when it has not been sought, it is invariably given on 
the creditor’s terms.62 During the financial crises in East Asia and Latin 
America, for example, the IMF provided money for what Nobel prize-
winning economist Joseph Stiglitz describes as a “bail-out for Western 
banks.”63 That is, Western banks and investors were repaid but the 
debtor states were left with the loans.64 These loans were often condi-
tioned on rigid structural adjustment plans (SAPs), under which bor-
rowing states were required to tighten their belts and slash social safety 
nets.65 In addition, most risks remained with the borrower. This condi-
                                                                                                                      
55 Collier, supra note 9, at 103; see also Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: U.S. 
Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 383, 383 (2008) 
(explaining the billions in military assistance money spent each year and that many recipi-
ents use this money, not for military assistance purposes, but instead for “international 
antagonism and repression of their citizens”). 
56 See Collier, supra note 9, at 100. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (citing The Center for Global Development). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 216 (2007). 
62 Id. at 217. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., David Harvey, The New Imperialism 167 (2003) (describing “literally hun-
dreds of protests against IMF-imposed austerity programmes . . . .”); Rogers M. Smith, Beyond 
Sovereignty and Uniformity: The Challenges for Equal Citizenship in the Twenty-first Century, 122 
Harv. L. Rev. 907, 911(2009) (reviewing Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Di-
lemmas of Contemporary Membership (2008); Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Wait-
ing: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (2006); and 
Peter J. Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization (2008)) 
(noting that international financial institutions have “restricted and sometimes restructured” 
domestic institutions and policies); Galit A. Sarfaty, Note, The World Bank and the Internaliza-
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tion was equally damaging because when exchange rates or interest 
rates changed, the borrowing state still had to meet its obligation. In-
deed, because most loans were payable on demand, those obligations 
often became due precisely when they were hardest to pay.66 
 Third, the current system of global reserves is an ongoing source 
of low cost loans for the West, especially the United States, but a formi-
dable obstacle to investment in infrastructure for LDCs. After the credit 
crises in Asia and Latin America during the 1990s, LDCs began to hold 
reserves to back their currencies.67 Before the 1970s, the conventional 
wisdom was that states needed gold to back their currencies. Now, the 
idea is that they need “confidence,” which can be grounded in a strong 
currency such as the U.S. dollar. 
 LDCs used to hold reserves of three to four months’ imports, but 
now, they generally hold reserves worth up to eight months of im-
ports.68 China, for example, has $900 billion reserved, mostly in U.S. 
Treasury bills.69 These are low interest investments, and more impor-
tantly, represent capital that China cannot invest in its own infrastruc-
ture.70 If an Asian enterprise borrows $100 million from a U.S. bank, 
the state adds $100 million to reserves.71 Thus, because the state has to 
have currency reserves equal to the debt, the loans are a wash. For this 
reason, Stiglitz concludes: “The global financial system is not working 
well . . . especially for developing countries. Money is flowing uphill, 
from the poor to the rich. The richest country in the world, the United 
States, . . . borrow[s] $2 billion a day from poorer countries.”72 This 
influx of wealth to the United States is part debt repayment and part 
global reserves. Consequently, development schemes promoted by 
                                                                                                                      
tion of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 Yale L. J. 1791, 1796–800 (2005) (explaining how the 
World Bank shapes the domestic law of borrowing states). 
66 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 218–19. 
67 See id.; see also Paul Krugman, Revenge of the Glut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2009, at A23 
(explaining that after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the emerging Asian econo-
mies “began protecting themselves by amassing huge war chests of foreign assets, in effect 
exporting capital to the rest of the world”). 
68 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 247. 
69 Id. at 248. 
70 See id. But see David Barboza, China Unveils Sweeping Plan for Economy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
9, 2008, at A1 (describing China’s plan to invest $586 billion in infrastructure over the 
next two years). 
71 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 249. 
72 Id. at 245. 
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these same Western neoliberals who rely on these low cost loans are not 
likely to reverse this inequitable flow.73 
 Fourth, global trade regimes likewise continue to benefit developed 
states at the expense of LDCs. Contrary to presumptions otherwise, 
trade liberalization does not “make everyone better off.” Rather, even 
when it makes “the country as a whole better off, it results in some 
groups being worse off.”74 The rules for world trade are established 
through periodic negotiations or “rounds” of talks among the members 
of the WTO, whose agendas are set by the wealthy industrialized states. 
The Uruguay Round, for instance, promised a “Grand Bargain” in 
which the LDCs would accept new rules on intellectual property, in-
vestments and services in exchange for a reduction of agricultural sub-
sidies and textiles quotas in the industrialized states.75 In reality, only the 
industrialized states benefited from the Grand Bargain. Sub-Saharan 
Africa lost $1.2 billion.76 Industrialized countries made no concessions 
on agricultural subsidies and left textile quotas in place for ten years.77 
Nonetheless, Eleanor Fox has observed that the elimination of subsidies 
by the WTO Member States would be the single most effective and far-
reaching measure to improve human welfare in the developing world. 
She explains: 
 “The human costs of unfair trade are immense. If Africa, 
East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America were each to in-
crease their share of world exports by one per cent the result-
ing gains in income could lift 128 million people out of pov-
erty. . . .” 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Audre Lourde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in This 
Bridge Called My Back 98, 99 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981) (“The 
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”). Development schemes promoted 
by China, in contrast, may well limit the flow of credit to the West. See Barboza, supra note 
70. 
74 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 68. 
75 Id. at 77. 
76 Id. 
77 The United States opened its markets to African cotton producers in 2005. Id. at 80–
81. Though the U.S. does not import cotton, cotton subsidies make it the world’s largest 
cotton exporter and effectively make competition by the LDCs impossible. Id. at 85–86; see 
also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for Discrimi-
natory Regulation of International Trade, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1405, 1445 (2008) (arguing that 
encouraging competition among United States and foreign companies, while simultane-
ously enforcing safety regulations, would significantly benefit U.S. consumers). 
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 If the nations of the WTO were to adopt one and only one 
human welfare measure, elimination of [subsidies in trade 
barriers] should be the measure.78 
Indeed, “[r]ich countries have cost poor countries three times more in 
trade restrictions than they give in total development aid.”79 
 Five years after the WTO’s Uruguay Round, protesters disrupted 
the next round scheduled to begin Seattle in 1999. Following the deba-
cle of the “Battle in Seattle,” the WTO convened in a more remote lo-
cation—Doha, Qatar—to avoid large protests.80 The Doha Round was 
touted as a “development round,” but again, there were few real con-
cessions to the LDCs.81 This seemingly unalterable trend would not 
have surprised Marx, who concluded his monograph On the Question of 
Free Trade: “To sum up, what is Free Trade under the present condition 
of society? [It is] Freedom of Capital.”82 
                                                                                                                      
78 Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Human Rights: Looking Out for the Welfare of the Worst 
Off, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 201, 211 (2002) (quoting Oxfam Int’l, Rigged Rules 
and Double Standards: Trade Globalisation, and the Fight Against Poverty 5 
(2002)). But see Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2007, at 28 (2007) (noting that the elimination of trade barriers benefits some 
LDCs at the expense of others). 
79 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 78. 
80 See The Battle in Seattle, Economist, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21; Paul Reynolds, Eyewitness: 
The Battle of Seattle, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/amercias/ 
547581.stm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). See Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, 
Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 61, 61–89 (2001) for a percep-
tive account of what was at stake. Various scholars have analyzed the “Battle of Seattle” in 
the larger context of global governance. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, Authority and Le-
gitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimen-
tarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 766, 779 n.62, 780 n.63 (2006); Richard B. Bilder & Richard Falk, 
Recent Books on International Law Book Review, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 264, 267 (2002) (reviewing 
Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, 
and the Critique of Ideology (2000) and Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Democ-
ratic Governance and International Law (2000)). 
81 Some argued that the collapse of the Doha Round of WTO talks precluded agree-
ment on effective measures to “lift millions out of poverty, curb rich countries’ ruinous 
farm support and open markets for countless goods and services.” The Future of Globalisa-
tion, Economist, July 29, 2006, at 11. 
82 Karl Marx, On the Question of Free Trade ( Jan. 9, 1848), in Micheline R. Ishay, 
The Human Rights Reader  228, 228 (2007). Marx stated: 
But, generally speaking, the Protective system in these days is conservative, 
while the free trade system works destructively. It breaks up old nationalities 
and carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the utter-most point. 
In a word, the Free Trade system hastens the social revolution. In this revolu-
tionary sense alone, gentleman, I am in favor of free trade. 
Id. at 229. 
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 Finally, the West has benefited politically as well as economically 
from the fiasco of development. During the Cold War, for example, aid 
was used to buy political support. As a result, a brutal lineup of dicta-
tors and crooks, whose only redeeming quality was their opposition to 
the Soviets, received aid from the West.83 Thus, as Stiglitz notes, al-
though most of those dictators are gone now, their people continue to 
struggle with the specter of their “odious debts.”84 Under Mobutu, for 
example, then-Zaire took on $8 billion in debt while its leader amassed 
a fortune estimated to be between $5–10 billion.85 As Stiglitz notes, 
“Chileans today are repaying the debts incurred during the Pinochet 
regime, South Africans the debts incurred during apartheid.”86 
 Marx probably would have been critical of the ideology of aid, just 
as he was critical of the ideology of rights.87 As noted above, he explic-
                                                                                                                      
83 See Mobutu’s Xanadu, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 26, 1999, at 82 (describing Gbadolite, a 
remote village in the Congo as an eerie wasteland which dictator Mobutu once filled with 
three palaces, a high-rise luxury hotel and conference center). The Soviets, of course, were 
likewise buying support. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, In Crisis, Zimbabwe Asks: Could Mugabe Lose?, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2008, at A1 (describing the decades of Mugabe’s rule, during which he 
mutated from a revolutionary leader to a tyrant who has led his country to a surreal na-
tional inflation rate of 100,000%). 
84 See Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 238–41; see also Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 
Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence and the Poverty of Nations 3–15 (2008) 
(explaining how corrupt regimes thrive and their effect on economic development); David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 696, 697–99 (2008) (reviewing Curtis 
J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporte Crises Reveal 
About Legal Systems and Economic Development Around the World (2008)) (noting 
links between corporate crises and economic development). 
85 Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 229. 
86 Id. Examples of Western leaders fraternizing with corrupt and tyrannical regimes 
are not limited to the distant past. During Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, for exam-
ple, he criticized George H.W. Bush, for “coddl[ing] dictators[,] stand[ing] aside from the 
global movement toward democracies [and] prefer[ing] a foreign policy that embrace[d] 
stability at the expense of freedom.” Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United 
States Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391, 2427 n.206 (1994) (quoting President Wil-
liam Clinton, Speech to the University of Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs (Oct. 1, 
1992)). 
87 As Marx explained: 
None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man, 
man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated from 
the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private 
interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. Man is far from be-
ing considered, in the rights of man, as a species-being; on the contrary, spe-
cies-life itself—society—appears as a system which is external to the individual 
and as a limitation of his original independence. The only bond between 
men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their 
property and their egoistic persons. 
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itly equated “free trade” with “freedom of capital.”88 But as Susan Marks 
notes, “international law was not part of his project.”89 Nevertheless, no 
one today argues that global capitalism is monolithic. In fact, as ex-
plained in Part II, a growing number of legal scholars recognize that 
the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and the MDG might not be able to 
agree upon objectives, or coordinate their efforts, even if they wanted.90 
II. A Postmodern Critique 
 While “many doubt whether the term [postmodernism] can ever 
be dignified by conceptual coherence,” two well-known definitions are 
pertinent here.91 First, as Jean-François Lyotard defines it, “Postmodern-
ism [is] incredulity toward metanarratives.”92 Like Marxists, postmod-
ernists challenge the metanarrative of development and the broader 
metanarrative of liberalism of which it is a part. For postmodernists, it is 
not that liberalism is the wrong metanarrative, but that all metanarra-
tives—including Marxism, liberalism, religion, and the Enlightenment 
itself—are suspect.93 Second, as Fredric Jameson suggests, “postmodern-
ism is the cultural logic of late capitalism.”94 Examining the metanarra-
                                                                                                                      
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, as reprinted in Human Rights, at 54, 56 (Louis Henken et 
al. eds., 1999). 
88 See Marx, supra note 82, at 39. As Marx notes, “[The Bourgeoisie] has resolved per-
sonal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered free-
doms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade.” Karl Marx, Commu-
nist Manifesto 82 (Penguin Books 1985) (1888). 
89 Marks, supra note 32, at 16. 
90 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 885, 885–89 
(2003) (discussing the dilemmas within the integration of the ILO Core Rights Labor Stan-
dards into the WTO); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor 
and Environmental Standards?, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347, 379–86, 401–03 (2004) (ex-
plaining some of the difficulties in negotiating common agreements); Elissa Alben, Note, 
GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 
1410, 1411–20 (2001) (putting the relationship between labor and trade in historical per-
spective). 
91 Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The Theory and Politics of Postmodernism, in Postmodernism 
and Society 1, 9 (Roy Boyne & Ali Ranttansi eds., 1990). 
92 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (1979). “Metanarrative” refers to 
an all-encompassing story that promises to explain everything. See, e.g., Kolakowski, supra 
note 15, at 356 (describing the “orthodox majority” which “maintained that Marxist doc-
trine itself contained the answers to all or most of the problems of philosophy”). 
93 See Judt, supra note 21, at 91 (“The Marxist project . . . was one strand in the great 
progressive narrative of our time: it shares with classical liberalism, its antithetical histori-
cal twin, that narrative’s optimistic, rationalistic account of modern society and its possi-
bilities.”). 
94 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
at xv (1991). 
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tive of development with Lyotard’s incredulity exposes its theoretical 
flaws. Then analyzing development in Jameson’s terms shows how this 
flawed metanarrative actually plays out in contemporary global culture. 
A. Incredulity Toward Metanarratives 
 The metanarrative of the Enlightenment replaced God with Rea-
son, and religion with science.95 Although the Enlightenment was 
deeply committed to humanism, reason and science do not inevitably 
lead to progress and human good.96 Indeed, some have noted the role 
of the Enlightenment itself in the Holocaust.97 After all, the “final solu-
tion” was not a barbarian rampage, but an orderly, systematic, “scien-
tific” program of genocide, bureaucratic and perversely “rational.”98 
 For postmodernists, all metanarratives have their own “will to 
power.”99 They tell us more about the ambitions of their proponents 
than about the world they claim to explain. For liberalism, the “univer-
                                                                                                                      
95 The substitution of Reason for God, of course, was not so neat. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that God was not entirely replaced by reason. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, 
Law as a Continuation of God by Others Means, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 427, 427–28 (1997) (explain-
ing how legal arguments replicate various proofs of the existence of God). 
96 See Peter Gay, The Science of Man and Society, in The Enlightenment: A Comprehen-
sive Anthology 479, 481 (Peter Gay ed., 1973) (observing that “[t]he philosophers were 
aware that their enterprise concealed a deep tension: knowledge did not always lead to 
improvement”) (emphasis omitted). 
97 See Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment 
168–69 ( John Cummings trans., The Continuum Publ’g Co. 1987) (1944). According to 
John Gray, the Enlightenment contemplated “the creation of a single worldwide civiliza-
tion.” John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism 2 (1998). Hence 
the United States, “the last great power to base its policies on this enlightenment thesis,” 
seeks the global domination of democratic capitalism, a “single universal free market.” Id. 
98 See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed 2–10 (1998) (arguing that states seek to make the life of 
society “legible” in order to make it controllable by political power); see also Judt, supra 
note 21, at 92 (“As for those who dream of rerunning the Marxist tape, digitally remas-
tered and free of irritating Communist scratches, they would be well advised to ask sooner 
rather than later just what it is about all-embracing ‘systems’ of thought that lead inexora-
bly to all-embracing ‘systems’ of rule.”). 
99 The phrase is Nietzsche’s. See Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Intro-
duction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 19 (1978) (“Nietzsche, according to 
Adorno, refused ‘complicity with the world’ which . . . comes to mean rejecting the preva-
lent norms and values of society on the ground that they have come to legitimise a society 
that in no way corresponds to them—they have become ‘lies.’”). This includes those who 
view “universalism,” or secular Western universalism, as a Western “will to power” or quest 
for hegemony. This critique may be addressed to radicals as well as liberals. See, e.g., Eve 
Darian-Smith, Power in Paradise: The Political Implications of Santos’s Utopia, 23 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 81, 86 (1998) (concluding that Santos’ goal “is, above all, modernist: it conceals 
relations of power in the march toward emancipation of the oppressed”). 
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sal” subject turns out to be a Western white man.100 As Pierre Schlag 
explains, 
 [P]ostmodernism questions the integrity, the coherence, 
and the actual identity of the humanist individual self. . . . For 
postmodernism, this humanist individual subject is a con-
struction of texts, discourses, and institutions. The promise 
that this particular human agent would realize freedom, 
autonomy, etc., has turned out to be just so much Kant.101 
 The liberal metanarrative of “development,” similarly, may sustain 
liberals but its value for its purported beneficiaries is less clear.102 As Bob 
Sutcliffe explains, the metanarrative of development is captured in the 
metaphor of a journey—nation states start from roughly the same place, 
but at different times.103 Thus, the LDCs are today where Europe was in 
the fourteenth century. For Sutcliffe, “The form of travel is character-
ized by the transfer of labour from low-productivity agriculture to 
higher-productivity industry and modern services.”104 But everyone 
ends up at the same place, with high consumption matching high pro-
ductivity. Economic progress brings electricity, toilets, education, ur-
banization, medical services, longer lives, democracy, and human 
rights—in short, modernization. 
 The metanarrative of development has given rise to three major 
critiques. Each challenges one of its underlying premises. First, the po-
larization critique argues that everyone does not end up in the same 
                                                                                                                      
100 See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 
379, 383 (1999) (“International law asserts a generality and universality that can appear 
strikingly incongruous in an international community made up of almost two hundred 
different nationalities and many more cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups.”). 
101 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, in Laying Down the Law: Mysti-
cism, Fetishism, and the American Legal Mind 24 (1996). 
102 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that “Easterly’s critique is not confined to 
foreign aid as it is usually defined; it is a critique of all grand plans to save the world 
hatched in Washington or London or Paris”). 
103 See Bob Sutcliffe, The Place of Development in Theories of Imperialism and Globalization, in 
Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm 135, 135 (Ronald 
Munck & Denis O’Hearn eds., 1999). Chin Leng Lim seems to eschew the development 
metanarrative in favor of empirical analyses of actual claims. See Chin Leng Lim, The Conven-
tional Morality of Trade, in Distributive Justice and International Economic Law, supra 
note 10. This approach resonates with the New Legal Realism. See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It 
Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wisc. L. Rev. 335, 339, 357–58 (2007). 
104 Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 135. Varun Gauri, Senior Economist at the World Bank, 
suggests that now the transfer of labor is from low-productivity agriculture to high-pro-
ductivity agriculture. Varun Gauri, Comment Made From the Audience at Symposium on 
Distributive Justice and International Law at Tillar House (Nov. 7, 2008). 
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place. Rather, Europe developed, and as a result, nations polarized into 
developed and underdeveloped states. This was set and unalterable by 
the end of the nineteenth century. As Sutcliffe explains, “Underdevel-
opment is, like Dorian Gray’s portrait, development’s alter ego.”105 The 
underdeveloped states can never catch up, in part because of all the 
trash—from environmental degradation to corrupt regimes—the de-
veloped states have left in their way. 
 Second, the attainability critique is grounded in the realization 
that it is physically impossible for the whole world to reach the same 
destination, to enjoy the level of consumption enjoyed by those in the 
West. Rather, because of greenhouse gases, contaminants, and nonre-
newable resources, “development” “cannot be generalized . . . without 
causing an apocalypse.”106 
 Third, and finally, a broad range of desirability critiques suggest 
that not everyone aspires to such levels of consumption. These critiques 
are diverse, ranging from those who seek spiritual, rather than material 
fulfillment, to those living off the land or off the grid, who seek a dif-
ferent kind of material fulfillment. What these critiques have in com-
mon is their rejection of high consumption/high productivity. They see 
“[rich developed states] full of needy, oppressed and unfulfilled peo-
ple.”107 In short, even if it were possible for the entire world to live like 
Americans, many would rather not. 
 The metanarrative of development raises more questions than it 
answers. It is economically, politically, and normatively problematic. 
While there are some inspiring success stories, overall the story of de-
velopment is dismal.108 It is jarringly out of sync with the liberal 
metanarrative of progress. 
B. The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
 Even if distributive justice was its objective, ‘international eco-
nomic law’ could neither mandate nor further distributive justice be-
                                                                                                                      
105 Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 136 (emphasis omitted). 
106 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed 498 
(2005); Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 137. Daniel Butt suggests a sensible response to this 
critique with his notion of “sufficientarianism.” Daniel Butt, Global Equality of Opportunity as 
an Institutional Standard of Distributive Justice, in Distributive Justice and International 
Economic Law, supra note 10. 
107 Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 138. 
108 See, e.g., Escobar, supra note 40, at 103–211 (discussing the transformation of 
strategies for development and those strategies’ new problems and successes); supra notes 
2, 10–12, and Part I.C. 
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cause ‘international economic law’ is not a legal subject with the capac-
ity to do so. Almost twenty years ago, Schlag identified this dilemma in 
American law as “the problem of the subject.”109 At that time the ques-
tion of “who or what it is that thinks or produces law”110 became a ma-
jor focus of domestic legal theory.111 In contrast, it has not been a focus 
of international law because the authority of international law is not 
taken for granted in the same way. 
 In fact, the authority of international law has been under relentless 
attack in this country. During the Cold War, as Harold Koh explains, 
self-described “realists” in the U.S. saw international law as “naive and 
virtually beneath discussion.”112 Those who defended international law 
in the U.S. were more inclined to circle the wagons, to insist that inter-
national law really was law, than to question its fundamental prem-
ises.113 Indeed, under the popular logic of the day such questioning 
could only aid the enemy.114 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1629 (1991). 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination 
and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1135, 1135–37 
(1988); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 Yale J.L. & Human. 97, 98–100 (1991); Mary Jane 
Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1019, 1019–55 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 
Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1195–243 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. 
L. Rev. 167, 167–90 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Consti-
tutional Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1442–69 (1990). 
112 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 
2616 (1997) (reviewing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995) and Tho-
mas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995)). For a post-
Cold War example of such an attack, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 
815, 834–38 (1997) (arguing that the Restatement incorrectly elevates customary interna-
tional law). 
113 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1824, 1861 (1998) (concluding that international law, the “law of nations,” is more 
properly viewed as the supreme law of the land). 
114 This ironically reproduced the silencing of proponents of international law by the 
“realists.” See Koh, supra note 112, at 2615 (describing the view that, “utopian moralizing 
about world government . . . like the strategy of appeasement, played into the hands of the 
Communist bloc”). Koh himself, for example, while noting the postmodern proliferation 
and fragmentation of “international law, transnational actors, decisional fora, and modes 
of regulations [which] mutate into fascinating hybrid forms,” firmly grounds his analysis in 
Anglo-American liberalism. Id. at 2630. 
While postmodernism has been criticized in the domestic context for similar reasons, no 
one credibly argues that “might makes right” in the domestic context. See, e.g., infra note 122. 
Critical theorists are constrained by the self-limiting social contract of the liberal state. In the 
international context, in contrast, that constraint evaporates. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan 
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 The decade following the end of the Cold War, bracketed by the 
first Iraq war and 9/11, was a tumultuous period for international law. 
In 1999, the American Journal of International Law published a Symposium 
on Method in International Law.115 The organizers, Steven R. Ratner and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, sought to “provide a greater grasp of the major 
theories of international law currently shared by scholars.”116 They de-
scribed the often jerky crossover of scholarly innovations from domestic 
law to international law and the Symposium showed how seven such 
“methods” had successfully made the leap.117 Postmodernism was con-
spicuous by its absence from this list—an absence attributable, at least 
in part, to ongoing ontological challenges to international law. Such 
challenges include ongoing charges that international law is not ‘law’ at 
all.118 
 Thus, American internationalists have been reluctant to recognize 
the problem of the subject—that is, that there may be no identifiable 
subject, or coherent principle, that “makes or produces” international 
economic law—since this might be construed as support for the 
broader, far more dubious, proposition that international law is what-
ever the United States says it is.119 But this conflates a normative project 
                                                                                                                      
Law?, 116 Yale L.J. 1022, 1033–37 (2007) (reviewing Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopol-
itanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006); Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics 
of Identity (2005); and Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Na-
tionality, Species Membership (2006)) (explaining the problems of extrapolating from 
state-centered liberal theory). 
115 Symposium on Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 291(1999). 
116 See Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International 
Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 291, 292 (1999). 
117 See id. at 292–93. The seven methods selected, with many lawyerly disclaimers and 
caveats, were: “legal positivism, the New Haven School, international legal process, critical 
legal studies, international law and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law 
and economics.” Id. at 293. 
118 I have explained the reasons for postmodernism’s absence from the Symposium, 
and the ways in which it nonetheless characterized the Symposium itself in other scholar-
ship. See Barbara Stark, After/word(s): ‘Violations of Human Dignity’ and Postmodern Interna-
tional Law, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 315, 317 (2002). There may be additional reasons, however. 
See, e.g., Lodge, supra note 26, at 43 (explaining how “the excruciating effort of construing 
this jargon-heavy [postmodern] discourse far exceeded the illumination likely to be 
gleaned from it, so [general readers] stopped reading it”). 
119 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 891–909 (2007) (arguing that Sosa rejects the posi-
tion that customary international law (CIL) has the status of self-executing federal com-
mon law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2091–102 (2005) (arguing for an extremely expansive 
executive role); Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 Yale L.J. 2380, 2410–15 
(2006) (arguing for an expansive view of executive power); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 729, 744–75 (2004) (defending the Bush Administration’s use of force). But 
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(that international law, in general, should serve the interests of the 
West) with a descriptive project (that international economic law, in 
particular, may have no coherent objective at all). 
 Rather, international economic law’s objectives are shaped by the 
“cultural logic of late capitalism.”120 For Jameson, this means the com-
modification of everything, including art and human well-being. Every-
thing has a price, and everything is for sale. As Schlag points out: 
“[O]urs is a world . . . where the value of freedom implies at once the 
downfall of the Berlin Wall and the imbibing of Pepsi.”121 The problem 
of distributive justice becomes a marketing problem. 
 This cultural logic not only allows us to recognize the problem of 
extreme poverty, it ironically commodifies it by generating a range of 
money-making responses, two of which are especially pertinent here. 
First, a personal charity became the “must-have” commodity of the hy-
per-rich.122 As journalist Alessandra Stanley observed, “After 25 years of 
ever-escalating exorbitance, the pendulum has swung towards conspicu-
ous nonconsumption. Extravagance is measured not by how much is 
                                                                                                                      
see Mary-Ellen O’Connell, American Society of Int’l Law, The Myth of Preemptive 
Self-Defense 3 (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (stating 
“the United States as a government has consistently supported the prohibition on such 
preemptive use of force”); Koh, supra note 112, at 2659 (“By interpreting global norms, 
and internalizing them into domestic law, [participation in the transnational legal process] 
leads to reconstruction of national interests and eventually national identities.”). I do not 
mean to suggest that internationalists are not interested in the question of “who or what 
makes or produces” international law. Indeed, there is large and growing scholarly litera-
ture, including works on: cosmopolitanism, see Appiah, supra note 114; Nussbaum, supra 
note 114; global networks, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century, 88 Foreign Affs. 94 
(2009); deliberative democracy, see Slaughter, supra, at 194; Richard Falk, What Comes 
After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge, 13 Widener L. Rev. 243 (2007); Andrew Strauss, 
Considering Global Democracy An Introduction to the Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic 
Global System, 13 Widener L. Rev. i (2007); Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic Global 
Democracy, 13 Widener L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
120 Jameson, supra note 94, at xv. 
121 Schlag, supra note 101, at 47. See generally Said, supra note 49, at 9–13(explaining 
why imperialism must be understood in cultural, as well as political and economic terms). 
122 See, e.g., James Traub, The Celebrity Solution, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 9, 2008, at 40 
(explaining how “Hollywood celebrities have become central players on deeply political 
issues like development aid”); Action Without Borders, How We’re Funded, http://www. 
idealist.org/en/about/funding.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (discussing earned in-
come from “Idealist Consultant and Vendor Directory” and “Idealist Nonprofit Career 
Fairs”). The point is not that such projects are necessarily suspect. In fact, some of these 
projects may well involve the kind of “piecemeal problem solving” suggested infra note 
145. There is, however, always the risk that such projects will become too successful. See, e.g., 
Elisabeth Malkin, Microloans, Big Profits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 2008, at C4 (noting that, while 
“[p]rofit is not a dirty word in the microfinance world,” a return of 19.6% raises ques-
tions). 
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spent, but by how much is given away.”123 Bill Gates, for example, vowed 
to eradicate polio.124 
 Second, multinational corporations agreed to donate a portion of 
their profits. Bono’s charity enlisted companies, including Dell and 
The Gap, to market lines which donate a portion of their profits to aid 
Africa.125 Pursuant to the cultural logic of late capitalism, global poverty 
would be addressed by shopping, that is, by the very overconsumption 
that perpetuates it. 
 Just as conspicuous consumption became a status symbol in Theo-
dore Veblen’s day, conspicuous philanthropy became a status symbol in 
ours.126 Getting photographed with African children makes celebrities 
look “good”—not only attractive, but moral as well. It also distracts the 
public from negative publicity.127 Angelina Jolie, for example, starred in 
an MTV documentary on The Poverty Crisis in Africa.128 
 The idea that the extremely well-off should give some of their 
wealth to the needy became part of the zeitgeist, the air we breathe and 
the coffee we drink.129 This was true at least until the current economic 
crisis.130 A recent article in Fortune magazine recognized this truth when 
                                                                                                                      
123 Alessandra Stanley, Humble Celebrity and Eager Interviewer, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2006, 
at E7. 
124 See Bill Gates, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009 Annual Letter from 
Bill Gates 14 (2009), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/Docu- 
ments/ 2009-bill-gates-annual-letter.pdf. Gates recently helped raise $600 million to do so. 
See id. 
125 See Ron Nixon, Bottom Line for (Red), N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2008, at Cl. 
126 See generally Theodore Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 69–101 (1899). 
127 See, e.g., Cate Doty, Who’s the Most Charitable of Us All? Celebrities Don’t Always Make the 
List, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, at C7 (noting Jolie’s acknowledgement that her charitable 
work distracts the public from her “colorful” personal life). 
128 Bill Saporito, The Jeff Sachs Contradiction: Celebrity Economist, Time, Mar. 14, 2005, at 
50; “Diary”: The Diary of Angelina Jolie and Dr. Jeffrey Sachs in Africa (MTV television broad-
cast, Sept. 14, 2005). Sachs has been called the “macroeconomist to the stars.” Daniel W. 
Drezner, Brother Can You Spare $195 Billion?, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Apr. 24, 2005, at 18. 
129 See, e.g., Starbucks Coffee Company Advertisement, We Have Something in Common, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2006, at N17 (“[In the clean water campaign to raise $10 million, 
Starbucks partnered with] non-governmental organizations to bring clean water, improved 
sanitation, and hygiene education to villages in need. What’s amazing is that once these 
basic needs are fulfilled, opportunities for education, agriculture, and commerce emerge–
children go to school, women start businesses, and the whole community begins to look 
forward to the future, which, it should be said, is another thing we all have in common.”). 
130 Jan M. Rosen, In Uncertain Times, Donors Hold Back, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2009, at G4 
(noting that charities “have suffered in the economic maelstrom, while their services are 
needed more than ever”). But see Matthew Bishop, A Tarnished Capitalism Still Serves Philan-
thropy, N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2008, at F25 (noting that the need for philanthrocapitalism is 
greater now than before, and philanthrocapitalists are looking to make “high perform-
ance” and “strategic” donations). 
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it reported that “leaders of the hedge fund world have banded together 
to fight poverty—taking gobs of money from the rich . . . and making 
philanthropy cool among the business elite.”131 The almost $65 billion 
in aid pledged by Buffet and Gates dwarf the contributions of many 
donor states, and they do not come with the same strings. As Singer 
observes, “Unconstrained by diplomatic considerations or the desire to 
swing votes at the United Nations, private donors can more easily avoid 
dealing with corrupt or wasteful governments. They can go directly into 
the field, working with local villages and grass-roots organizations.”132 
 Indeed, private charity may well be more effective than public 
rights, especially if the former means billions of dollars and the latter 
means empty promises. But while charity can be a force for good, it is 
not a particularly dependable force. In the face of a global economic 
crisis, donors may simply change their minds with regard to past, pre-
sent, and future pledges.133 Even though the impact of the current 
global economic crisis on international donors is an open question, we 
can see that no one is more vulnerable to shifting social mores than the 
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poor.134 Furthermore, charity does not mandate a careful distribution 
of costs or benefits, or provide an antidote for donor fatigue. 135 
 Finally, even in the case of these private charities, the lion’s share 
of benefits raised remains in the developed states. Western advertising 
firms, for example, have been the major beneficiaries of the widely rec-
ognized “Red” campaign. Red companies spent as much as $100 mil-
lion in advertising to raise $18 million for Africa.136 Moreover, the Red 
companies stop giving as consumers stop spending.137 Each of these 
variables make evident that private charity is no panacea for the prob-
lem of global poverty. 
Conclusion: What About Today? 
 This is a question that neither Marx nor the postmodernists deign 
to answer, for similar reasons. For Marx, any answer is subject to the 
“false consciousness” that inspires it; that is, the futile hope that there is 
a possibility of authentic “species-life” within capitalism. For the post-
modernists, the question shows the questioner’s inability to let go of 
the Enlightenment metanarrative. Surely reason and science, pumped 
up by our unprecedented ability to generate and manipulate data, will 
lead to a solution. Alice cannot stop arguing with the Queen.138 
 Perhaps, this Article suggests, she is wasting her time. As Schlag 
observes, “One might think that destruction is inherently bad and con-
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struction inherently good, but . . . . it all depends on what is being de-
stroyed and what is being constructed.”139 As Roy Boyne and Ali Rat-
tansi point out, there is a “postmodernism of ‘resistance’ as well as a 
postmodernism of ‘reaction.’”140  Neither should be left unprobed. 
 You do not have to be a Marxist to share Marx’s conviction that 
“the destiny of our world as a whole is tied up with the condition of its 
poorest and most disadvantaged members.”141 Nor do you have to be a 
Marxist to realize that the playing field is not level, and that the winners 
may not even notice.142 Likewise, you do not have to be a postmodern-
ist to reject the metanarrative of development or to doubt that rich ce-
lebrities and more shopping will promote distributive justice. Nor, must 
you accept the metanarrative of development to believe that the lives of 
the poorest should, and can, be better. Indeed, it may be necessary to 
destroy that metanarrative, or “turn it inside out” as Jeffrey Dunoff sug-
gests, to even imagine what might actually work.143 
 Dunoff urges would-be reformers to step aside and leave “devel-
opment” to those who would be developed.144 Rittich takes a similar 
position by urging the would-be developers to “create space for local 
alternatives.”145 She reminds us that her advice is grounded in the foun-
dational norm of self-determination, “the intuition behind [which] . . . 
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is that important . . . legal reforms . . . should be made . . . by those who 
will have to live with the consequences.”146 
 Taking such advice does not mean that the rich North should dis-
engage from the poor South, however, because the time for that has 
passed.147 Neither should reformers forget earlier efforts and earlier 
failures. In the 1970s, for instance, the industrialized states attempted 
to block a major initiative by the former colonies of the European pow-
ers to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO).148 Their 
numbers enabled the former colonies to pass resolutions in the Gen-
eral Assembly over the objections of the Western industrialized states. 
Nevertheless, when Libya tried to nationalize Western property without 
adequate compensation, as the NIEO would have allowed, it was firmly 
rebuffed.149 
 But it is not too late to ask whether, as Marxists suggest, interna-
tional economic law’s most important client is the neoliberalism that 
created it, or whether as the postmodernists might argue, “interna-
tional economic law” is not a subject with the capacity to change direc-
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tion.150 Rather, like normative legal thought, “[international economic 
law] will [simply] tell you what to do even though there is not the 
slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.”151 
There may be little to lose by “laying down the law,” as Schlag suggests, 
and recognizing that the Queen, along with her entourage, is nothing 
but a pack of cards.152 
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